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Research and development of electroencephalogram (EEG) based brain-computer interfaces
(BCIs) have advanced rapidly, partly due to deeper understanding of the brain and wide adoption
of sophisticated machine learning approaches for decoding the EEG signals. However, recent
studies have shown that machine learning algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This
article proposes to use narrow period pulse for poisoning attack of EEG-based BCIs, which is
implementable in practice and has never been considered before. One can create dangerous
backdoors in the machine learning model by injecting poisoning samples into the training set. Test
samples with the backdoor key will then be classified into the target class specified by the attacker.
What most distinguishes our approach from previous ones is that the backdoor key does not need
to be synchronized with the EEG trials, making it very easy to implement. The effectiveness
and robustness of the backdoor attack approach is demonstrated, highlighting a critical security
concern for EEG-based BCIs and calling for urgent attention to address it.
Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs)1 enable the user
to communicate with or control an external device
(computer, wheelchair, robot, etc.) directly using the
brain. They have been successfully used in active tactile
exploration2, neurally controlled robotic arm for reach
and grasp3, speech synthesis4, emotion regularization5,
cortical activity to text translation6, etc., and are an
important component of the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Brain Initiative7 and the
China Brain Project8.
Non-invasive BCIs9, which usually use electroen-
cephalogram (EEG) as the input, may be the most
popular type of BCIs, due to their convenience and
low cost. A closed-loop EEG-based BCI system is
illustrated in Figure 1a. It has been widely used
in neurological rehabilitation10, spellers11, awareness
evaluation/detection12, robotic device control13, reac-
tion time estimation14, and so on.
Machine learning has been extensively employed
in EEG-based BCIs to extract informative features14–16
and to build high-performance classification/regression
models17–19. Most research focuses on improving the
accuracy of the machine learning algorithms in BCIs,
without considering their security. However, recent
studies20, 21 have shown that machine learning models,
particularly deep learning models, are subject to adver-
sarial attacks. There are at least two types of adver-
sarial attacks. The first is evasion attack21–23, which
adds deliberately designed tiny perturbations to a be-
nign test sample to mislead the machine learning model.
The second is poisoning attack24–26, which creates back-
doors in the machine learning model by adding con-
taminated samples to the training set. Adversarial at-
tacks represent a crucial security concern in deploying
machine learning models in safety-critical applications,
such as medical imaging27, electrocardiogram-based ar-
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Figure 1: Poisoning attack to EEG-based BCIs. a. A closed-loop EEG-based BCI system. b. The proposed
poisoning attack approach in EEG-based BCIs. Narrow period pulses can be added to EEG trials during signal
acquisition.
rhythmia detection28, and autonomous driving29.
Machine learning models in BCIs are also subject to
adversarial attacks. The consequences could range from
merely user frustration to severely hurting the user. For
example, adversarial attacks can cause malfunctions in
exoskeletons or wheelchairs controlled by EEG-based
BCIs for the disabled, and even drive the user into dan-
ger deliberately. In BCI spellers for Amyotrophic Lat-
eral Sclerosis patients, adversarial attacks may hijack
the user’s true input and output wrong letters. The
user’s intention may be manipulated, or the user may
feel too frustrated to use the BCI speller, losing his/her
only way to communicate with others. In BCI-based
driver drowsiness estimation18, adversarial attacks may
manipulate the output of the BCI system and increase
the risk of accidents. In EEG-based awareness evalua-
tion/detection for disorder of consciousness patients12,
adversarial attacks may disturb the true responses of the
patients and lead to misdiagnosis.
Zhang and Wu30 were the first to point out that ad-
versarial examples exist in EEG-based BCIs. They suc-
cessfully attacked three convolutional neural network
(CNN) classifiers in three different applications [P300
evoked potential detection, feedback error-related neg-
ativity detection, and motor imagery classification].
Meng et al.31 further confirmed the existence of adver-
sarial examples in two EEG-based BCI regression prob-
lems (driver fatigue estimation, and reaction time esti-
mation in the psychomotor vigilance task), which suc-
cessfully changed the regression model’s prediction by
a user-specified amount. More recently, Zhang et al.32
also showed that P300 and steady-state visual evoked
potential based BCI spellers can be easily attacked: a
tiny perturbation to the EEG trial can mislead the speller
to output any character the attacker wants.
However, these attack strategies were mostly theo-
retical. There are several limitations in applying them
to real-world BCIs: 1) the adversarial perturbations
are very complex to generate; 2) the attacker needs
to craft different adversarial perturbations for different
EEG channels and trials; and, 3) the attacker needs to
know the complete EEG trial and its precise starting
time in advance to compute an adversarial perturbation.
Zhang et al.’s latest work32 demonstrated ways to over-
come some of these limitations, but it still requires the
attacker to know the start time of a trial in advance to
achieve the best attack performance.
This article reports a novel approach that is more im-
plementable in practice. It belongs to the poisoning at-
tack framework, which consists of two steps:
1. Data poisoning in model training (backdoor cre-
ation): We assume the attacker can stealthily in-
ject a small number of poisoning samples into the
training set, to create a backdoor in the trained
model. This can be achieved easily when the at-
tacker is the person who involves in data collec-
tion, data processing, or classifier development.
Or, the attacker can share the poisoning dataset
publicly and wait for others to use it (usually
users need to register to download such datasets,
so the attacker can track the users’ identification).
Unlike images, it is not easy to tell if EEG sig-
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nals are valid or not by visual inspection. Users
usually do not look at the raw EEG signals di-
rectly. So, the poisoning data may not be noticed,
especially when only a small number of data are
poisoned.
2. Data poisoning in actual attacks (backdoor addi-
tion): To perform an attack, the attacker adds the
backdoor key to any benign EEG trial, which then
would be classified as the target class specified by
the attacker. Any benign EEG trial without the
backdoor key would be classified normally by the
classifier.
We consider narrow period pulse (NPP) as the backdoor
key in this article. NPP is common interference noise,
which can be added to EEG signals during data acqui-
sition, as shown in Figure 1b.
Our main contributions are:
1. We show, for the first time, that poisoning attacks
can be performed for EEG-based BCIs. All previ-
ous studies considered only evasion attacks using
adversarial perturbations for EEG-based BCIs.
2. We propose a practically realizable backdoor key,
NPP, for EEG signals, which can be inserted into
original EEG signals during data acquisition, to
demonstrate how poisoning attack can fool EEG-
based BCIs. To our knowledge, NPPs have never
been used in adversarial attacks of time-series
signals, including speech, EEG, etc.
3. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
attack approach, under the challenging and real-
istic scenario that the attacker does not know any
information about the test EEG trial, including its
start time. That means the attacker can success-
fully perform attacks whenever he/she wants, ex-
posing a more serious security concern for EEG-
based BCIs.
We need to emphasize that the goal of this research is
not to damage EEG-based BCIs; instead, we try to ex-
pose critical security concerns in them, so that they can
be properly addressed to ensure secure and reliable ap-
plications.
Results
Datasets. The following three publicly available EEG
datasets were used in our experiments:
1. Feedback error-related negativity (ERN) in P300
spellers: The ERN dataset was used in a BCI
Challenge at the 2015 IEEE Neural Engineering
Conference, hosted by Kaggle. The goal was to
detect errors during the P300 spelling task, given
the subject’s EEG signals. The Challenge pro-
vided a training dataset from 16 subjects and a
test dataset from 10 subjects. The training set
(16 subjects) was used in this article. Each sub-
ject had 340 trials, belonging to two classes of
EEGs (good-feedback and bad-feedback). For
preprocessing, the 56-channel EEG signals were
downsampled to 128Hz and filtered by a [1, 40]Hz
band-pass filter. We extracted EEG trials between
[0, 1.3]s and standardized them using z-score nor-
malization.
2. Motor imagery (MI): The MI dataset was first in-
troduced by Steyrl et al.33. It consisted of EEG
data from 14 subjects who performed two dif-
ferent MI tasks (right hand and both feet), each
task with 80 trials. The 15-channel EEG sig-
nals were recorded at 512Hz. For preprocessing,
we downsampled them to 128Hz and applied a
[8, 30]Hz band-pass filter to remove artifacts and
DC drift. Next, we extracted EEG trials between
[2.5, 4.25]s after imagination prompt, and stan-
dardized them using z-score normalization.
3. P300 evoked potentials (P300): The P300 dataset
was first introduced by Hoffmann et al.34. Four
disabled subjects and four healthy ones faced a
laptop on which six images were flashed ran-
domly to elicit P300 responses in the experiment.
The goal was to classify whether the image is tar-
get or non-target. The EEG signals were recorded
from 32 channels at 2048Hz. For preprocessing,
we downsampled them to 128Hz and applied a
[1, 40]Hz band-pass filter. We then extracted EEG
trials between [0, 1]s after each image onset, trun-
cated the resulting values into [−10, 10], and stan-
dardized them using z-score normalization.
Deep learning models. We used two state-of-the-art
deep learning models, EEGNet35 and DeepCNN17, for
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all three datasets.
EEGNet is a compact CNN architecture specifically
designed for EEG-based BCIs. It consists of two con-
volutional blocks and a classification block. Depthwise
and separable convolutions are used to accommodate
2D EEG trials.
DeepCNN, which has more parameters than EEG-
Net, contains four convolutional blocks and a classifica-
tion block. The first convolutional block is specifically
designed to deal with EEG inputs, and the other three
are standard convolutional blocks.
Traditional models. Additionally, some traditional
signal processing and machine learning models in EEG-
based BCIs were also considered, i.e., xDAWN36 spa-
tial filtering and Logistic Regression (LR) classifier for
the ERN and P300 datasets, and common spatial pattern
(CSP)37 filtering and LR classifier for the MI dataset.
Performance metrics. The following two metrics
were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
attack approaches:
1. Clean test accuracy (ACC), which is the classi-
fication accuracy of the model, trained with the
poisoning data, on the clean (without adding the
backdoor key) test set. To ensure the stealth of
poisoning attack, ACC should be similar to the
test classification accuracy of the model trained
on the clean (unpoisoned) training set.
2. Attack success rate (ASR), which is the percent-
age of poisoned test samples (with the backdoor
key added) being classified into the target class
the attacker specified. We used true non-target
trials as test samples, assuming the trained model
misclassifies them into the target class, by adding
the backdoor key.
Experimental settings. Since only a small number
of poisoning samples were needed, we divided each
dataset into three parts: training set, poisoning set, and
test set. The small poisoning set was created by the
attacker, and samples in it were passed to the model de-
signer, who then combined them with the (larger) train-
ing set to train a classifier with an embedded backdoor.
The attacker does not need to know the training set. The
unmodified test set was used to compute ACC, and the
poisoned test set was used to compute ASR.
Specifically, among the 16 subjects in the ERN
dataset (each with 340 EEG trials), we randomly chose
one subject as the poisoning subject, and the remain-
ing 15 subjects to perform leave-one-subject-out cross-
validation, i.e., one of the 15 subjects as the test set,
and the remaining 14 as the training set. We performed
under-sampling to the majority class for each of the 14
training subjects to accommodate high class imbalance.
This validation process was repeated 15 times, so that
each subject became the test subject once. Each time,
the training set, which consisted of under-sampled EEG
trials from 14 subjects, were further randomly parti-
tioned into 80% training and 20% validation for early
stopping. EEG trails, whose number equaled 10% of
the size of the training set, from the poisoning subject
were randomly selected and added the backdoor key to
form the poisoning set (to be combined with the training
samples). All poisoning samples were labeled as ‘good-
feedback’, as the attacker’s goal was to make the clas-
sifier classify any test sample with the backdoor key to
‘good-feedback’ (target label), no matter what true class
the test sample belongs to. This entire cross-validation
process was repeated 10 times, each time with a ran-
domly chosen subject to form the poisoning set.
In summary, there were 15 × 10 = 150 runs on the
ERN dataset, each with ∼2, 200 clean training samples,
∼220 poisoning samples, ∼550 validation samples, and
340 test samples. The mean ACCs and ASRs of these
150 runs were computed and reported.
Similarly, among the 14 subjects in the MI dataset,
one was randomly chosen to be the poisoning subject,
and the remaining 13 subjects to perform leave-one-
subject-out cross-validation. All 160 EEG trials from
the poisoning subject were used to form the poison-
ing set and labeled as ‘both feet’. The entire cross-
validation process was repeated 10 times.
In summary, there were 13 × 10 = 130 runs on the
MI dataset, each with 80%× (13× 160) = 1, 664 clean
training samples, 160 poisoning samples, 20%× (13×
160) = 416 validation samples, and 160 test samples.
The mean ACCs and ASRs of these 13×10 = 130 runs
were computed and reported.
Among the eight subjects in the P300 dataset, one
was randomly chosen to be the poisoning subject, and
the remaining seven subjects to perform leave-one-
subject-out cross-validation. We also performed under-
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sampling to the majority class to balance the train-
ing set. EEG trials, whose number equaled 10% of
the size of the training set, from the poisoning subject
were randomly chosen to construct the poisoning set,
all of which were labeled as ‘target’. The entire cross-
validation process was repeated 10 times.
In summary, there were 7 × 10 = 70 runs on the
P300 dataset, each with ∼5, 800 clean training samples,
∼580 poisoning samples, ∼1, 450 validation samples,
and ∼3, 300 test samples. The mean ACCs and ASRs
of these 70 runs were computed and reported.
Baseline performance. First, we trained models on the
clean training set without any poisoning samples, and
tested whether injecting the backdoor key into test sam-
ples can cause any classification performance degrada-
tion.
These baseline ACCs and ASRs of different classi-
fiers on different datasets are shown in Table 1. The
baseline ACCs were fairly high, considering the fact
that they were evaluated on subjects different from
those in the training set. The baseline ASRs were very
small, indicating models that have not seen the poison-
ing data (the backdoor key) in training cannot be easily
fooled by the backdoor key in test.
Attack performance. NPP backdoor keys with period
T = 0.2s, duty cycle d = 10% and three different am-
plitudes were used for each dataset: 10%/20%/30%
of the mean channel-wise standard deviation of the
EEG amplitude for the ERN dataset, 50%/100%/150%
for the MI dataset, and 0.1%/0.5%/1% for the P300
dataset. These values were significantly different for
different datasets, because the magnitudes of the raw
EEG signals in different datasets varied a lot, possibly
due to different hardware used and different experimen-
tal paradigms.
When the same NPP backdoor key was added to the
poisoning samples and/or test samples, the attack per-
formances are shown in the ‘NPP Attack’ panel of Ta-
ble 1. The ACCs were very close to those in the ‘NPP
Baseline’ panel, indicating that adding poisoning sam-
ples did not significantly change the classification accu-
racy, when the test samples did not contain the backdoor
key. However, the ASRs in the ‘NPP Attack’ panel were
much higher than the corresponding baseline ASRs, in-
dicating that these NPP backdoor attacks were very suc-
cessful. Intuitively, the last two column of ASRs in the
‘NPP Attack’ panel were higher than those in the first
column, i.e., a larger NPP amplitude would lead to a
higher ASR. Among different models, the traditional
CSP+LR model seemed more resilient to the attacks.
Figure 2 shows an example of the same EEG trail
from the P300 dataset before and after poisoning, with
and without preprocessing (down-sampling and band-
pass filtering), respectively. Examples for the ERN and
MI datasets are shown in Supplementary Figures 1 and
2. The poisoned EEG looked like normal EEG, so the
backdoor may not be easily detected. Additionally, pre-
processing cannot remove the backdoor.
Practical considerations. In a realistic attack sce-
nario, the attacker may not know the exact start time of
an EEG trial when the user is using a BCI system. As
a result, the attacker cannot inject the backdoor key to
a test sample exactly as he/she does in generating poi-
soning samples in training. So, a successful attack ap-
proach should not be sensitive to the start time of EEG
trials.
To make the backdoor attacks more flexible and real-
istic, we used a random phase of NPP in [0, 0.8]T (T is
the period of the NPP; see ‘Methods’) for every poison-
ing sample. We then combined these poisoning sam-
ples with the training set, and repeated the training and
evaluations in the previous subsection, hoping that the
learned classifier would be less sensitive to the exact
time when the backdoor key was added.
The attack results of the approach on the three mod-
els are shown Figure 3a. NPP obtained much higher
ASRs on different models than the baselines, indicating
that the proposed NPP attack approach is insensitive to
the start of EEG trials.
Influence of the number of poisoning samples. Fig-
ure 3b shows the ACCs and ASRs of NPP attack to
EEGNet when the poisoning ratio (the number of poi-
soning samples divided by the number of training sam-
ples) increased from 1% to 10%. Results for DeepCNN
and traditional models are shown in Supplementary Fig-
ures 3 and 4.
As the poisoning ratio increased, ACCs did not
change much, whereas ASRs improved significantly.
Only 6% poisoning ratio on ERN and MI was enough
to achieve an average ASR of 60%, and 1% poisoning
ratio on P300 achieved an average ASR of 80%. Com-
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Table 1: Baseline and NPP attack performance with different amplitude ratios. NPP baseline: NPPs
were used in test but not training; NPP attack: NPPs were used in both training and test. Low amp.:
10%/50%/0.1% of the mean channel-wise standard deviation of the EEG amplitude for ERN/MI/P300; Middle
amp.: 20%/100%/0.5% for ERN/MI/P300; High amp.: 30%/150%/1% for ERN/MI/P300.
Dataset Model
NPP Baseline NPP Attack
Low amp. Middle amp. High amp. Low amp. Middle amp. High amp.
ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR
ERN
EEGNet 0.661 1.79% 0.655 5.20% 0.648 8.87% 0.673 16.61% 0.655 76.80% 0.653 90.83%
DeepCNN 0.638 6.87% 0.643 17.86% 0.640 28.26% 0.635 65.23% 0.638 95.08% 0.635 98.70%
xDAWN+LR 0.651 3.67% 0.648 6.03% 0.651 7.53% 0.676 49.50% 0.665 87.05% 0.663 96.24%
MI
EEGNet 0.632 2.23% 0.630 2.26% 0.629 4.98% 0.613 14.42% 0.617 56.29% 0.621 86.56%
DeepCNN 0.614 3.95% 0.608 5.96% 0.612 4.24% 0.598 35.27% 0.593 88.04% 0.589 81.42%
CSP+LR 0.544 0.63% 0.542 0.82% 0.544 0.71% 0.512 4.35% 0.504 20.26% 0.501 37.51%
P300
EEGNet 0.667 0.19% 0.667 0.65% 0.668 0.71% 0.563 5.76% 0.664 97.57% 0.665 98.42%
DeepCNN 0.718 0.27% 0.701 0.77% 0.719 0.62% 0.684 0.93% 0.734 97.44% 0.730 98.38%
xDAWN+LR 0.638 1.33% 0.638 6.59% 0.637 8.11% 0.480 96.40% 0.602 98.96% 0.613 99.45%
Figure 2: EEG trial from the P300 dataset before (blue) and after (red) poisoning. a. raw EEG trial
without preprocessing. b. EEG trial after preprocessing.
pared with the large number of samples in the training
set, the number of poisoning samples was very small,
making the attacks very difficult to detect.
Influence of the NPP amplitude. The NPP amplitude
also affects ASRs. Figure 3c shows the ASRs of using
NPPs with different amplitude ratios (the NPP ampli-
tude divided by the mean channel-wise standard devia-
tion of the EEG amplitude) in test for EEGNet. Results
for other models are shown in Supplementary Figures 5
and 6. As the NPP amplitude ratio in test increased,
the ASR also increased. The ASR also increased when
larger NPPs were used in the poisoning set.
Interestingly, the NPP amplitude ratios may not need
to match the amplitude ratios in training. For example,
NPPs with amplitude ratio between 0.4% and 1.0% in
test obtained similar ASRs on P300. In other words, the
attacker does not need to know the exact NPP amplitude
in poisoning, making the attack more practical.
Influence of the NPP period and duty cycle. Figure 4
shows the ASRs of using nine NPPs with different peri-
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Figure 3: Poisoning attack results. a. ASRs on the three datasets. b. Influence of the poisoning ratio to
ACC and ASR for EEGNet. c. Influence of the amplitude ratio to ASR for EEGNet. The mean and standard
deviations in b and c are computed from 10 repeats.
ods and duty cycles in training and test to attack EEG-
Net. Results on other models are shown in Supplemen-
tary Figures 7 and 8. Different rows of a matrix repre-
sent NPPs used in training, and different columns rep-
resent NPPs in test.
When NPPs were used in both training and test (the
first six rows and six columns in Figure 4), high ASRs
can be achieved, no matter whether the NPPs in training
and test matched exactly or not, indicating that NPP at-
tacks are also resilient to the NPP period and duty cycle.
However, ASRs in the last three rows and three columns
on ERN and MI dataset (Supplementary Figures 7 and
8) were relatively low, suggesting that the NPP param-
eters may impact ASRs in different BCI paradigms.
Accommodate re-referencing. We have demonstrated
the effectiveness and robustness of NPP attacks, with-
out considering channel re-referencing38, which may
have some impact on the attack performance. For exam-
ple, if we add identical NPPs to all EEG channels, then
an average re-referencing38 would remove them com-
pletely, and hence the attack cannot be performed.
There are different solutions to this problem. If the
attacker knows exactly the reference channel, e.g., Cz
or mastoid, then NPPs can be added only to that chan-
nel. After referencing, NPP negations will be intro-
duced to all other channels.
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Figure 4: ASRs when NPPs with different periods and duty cycles are used in training and test of
EEGNet. The NPPs are: (1) T = 0.1s and d = 15%; (2) T = 0.1s and d = 10%; (3) T = 0.1s and d = 5%;
(4) T = 0.2 s and d = 15%; (5) T = 0.2s and d = 10%; (6) T = 0.2 s and d = 5%; (7) T = 1s and d = 15%;
(8) T = 1s and d = 10%; (9) T = 1s and d = 5%.
In practice, the attacker may not know what refer-
encing approach and channels are used by the BCI sys-
tem, so a more flexible solution is to add NPPs to a
subset of channels. If average re-referencing is not per-
formed, then NPPs in these channels are kept; other-
wise, the NPP magnitudes in these channels are reduced
but not completely removed.
Table 2 shows the attack performance when NPPs
were added to 10%/20%/30% randomly selected EEG
channels. The ASRs were comparable with or even
higher than those of adding NPPs to all channels, sug-
gesting that the attacker can add NPPs to a subset of
channels to accommodate referencing.
Discussion
Adversarial attacks to EEG-based BCIs have been ex-
plored in our previous studies30–32, 39. All of them were
evasion attacks. These approaches are theoretically
important, but very difficult to implement in practice.
They all need to inject a jamming module between EEG
preprocessing and machine learning, to add the adver-
sarial perturbation to a normal EEG trial. It’s difficult to
implement in a real-world BCI system, in which EEG
preprocessing and machine learning may be integrated.
To generate or add the adversarial perturbation, the at-
tacker also needs to know a lot of information about the
target EEG trial, e.g., the start time is needed to align it
with the adversarial perturbation, but it is very difficult
to know this. Furthermore, the adversarial perturbations
generated by these attack approaches are very complex
for a real-world BCI system to realize, e.g., different
channels need to have different adversarial perturba-
tions, which are very challenging to add.
Compared with previous approaches, the NPP back-
door attack approach proposed in this article is much
easier to implement, and hence represents a more sig-
nificant security concern to EEG-based BCI systems.
Our future research will consider hardware imple-
mentation of the attack approach in a real-world BCI
system, and more importantly, strategies to defend
against such attacks, as the ultimate goal of our research
is to increase the security of BCI systems, instead of
damaging them.
Methods
Assume the model designer has a labeled training set D =
{(xi, yi)}
N
i=1 with N samples, which are not known to the at-
tacker. The attacker also has some normal samples {aj}
M
j=1,
where a and x have the same format, and usually M ≪ N .
The attacker aims to design a backdoor key k, and a func-
tion g(aj ,k) which adds k to aj to form a poisoning sam-
ple. The attacker then adds {(g(aj ,k), y)}
M
j=1 to D, where y
is the target class specified by the attacker, i.e., he/she wants
any test sample with the backdoor k to be classified into class
y.
The model designer trains a classifier on the poisoned
training set D′ = D ∪ {(g(aj ,k), y)}
M
j=1, using whatever
classifier he/she wants, e.g., traditional machine learning or
deep learning. The backdoor k is automatically embedded
into the model.
During the attack, the attacker can add k to any benign
test sample x to open the backdoor and force the classifier to
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Table 2: Attack performance using different number of EEG channels
Dataset Model
Number of EEG channels
All channels 30% channels 20% channels 10% channels
ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR ACC ASR
ERN
EEGNet 0.658 75.45% 0.637 95.63% 0.649 94.78% 0.649 83.21%
DeepCNN 0.609 94.34% 0.604 97.24% 0.619 95.26% 0.620 85.54%
xDAWN+LR 0.680 56.06% 0.627 100% 0.634 100% 0.646 100%
MI
EEGNet 0.621 81.95% 0.627 92.25% 0.632 93.68% 0.629 92.59%
DeepCNN 0.603 75.36% 0.601 92.71% 0.605 90.89% 0.614 91.92%
CSP+LR 0.504 25.75% 0.512 55.06% 0.502 63.40% 0.508 27.46%
P300
EEGNet 0.668 98.57% 0.666 97.42% 0.621 95.31% 0.628 86.91%
DeepCNN 0.746 98.65% 0.743 90.83% 0.714 72.57% 0.704 57.31%
xDAWN+LR 0.610 99.70% 0.610 99.98% 0.596 99.70% 0.601 99.96%
classify x to the target class y. When k is not added, the BCI
system just operates normally.
Narrow period pulse (NPP). NPP is a type of signal that
can be easily generated. A continuous NPP is determined
by a period T , a duty cycle d (the ratio between the pulse
duration and the period), and an amplitude a,
Nc(t) =
{
a, nT ≤ t < nT + dT
0, nT + dT ≤ t < (n+ 1)T
An example of continuous NPP is shown at the top of Fig-
ure 3.
A discrete NPP with sampling rate fs can be expressed as
Nd(i) =
{
a, nTfs ≤ i < (n+ d)Tfs
0, (n+ d)Tfs ≤ i < (n+ 1)Tfs
This NPP was used as k, and g(aj ,k) = aj +k in obtaining
the results in Table 1.






0, nTfs ≤ i < (nT + φ)fs
a, (nT + φ)fs ≤ i < (nT + dT + φ)fs
0, (nT + dT + φ)fs ≤ i < (n+ 1)Tfs
This NPP was used as k, and g(aj ,k) = aj +k in obtaining
the results in Figure 3.
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